Between now
and 2050, there will be a sharp increase in the demand for agricultural
products. This is caused by an increase of the world’s population from 7
billion today (2012) to 9 billion, the rise in global calorie intake by 60% due
to greater affluence, particularly in countries like China and India, and the
production of bio-fuels (Meridian Institute 2011). The increase in agricultural
production is likely to be accompanied by an increase in the emission of
greenhouse gasses. Agriculture is responsible for 30% of total global
greenhouse emissions, mainly through land-use change (particularly
deforestation driven by agricultural expansion, also affecting biodiversity),
methane and nitrous oxide emissions (from livestock and the use of
fertilizers). The Meridian Institute, in its 2011 report ‘Agriculture and
Climate Change: a Scoping Report’ shows that agriculture is not only a major
cause of climate change but in many regions of the world, it is also seriously
impacted by climate change. It is expected that by 2050, 56% of crops in
Sub-Saharan Africa and 21% of crops in Asia will be negatively affected by the
consequences of climate change, for instance because of shifts in water
availability, temperature shifts, and changes in the occurrence of pests. This
often has direct effects on the availability of food. In other regions, such as
Europe, it seems that at least in the short term, climate change can be
beneficial to agricultural production, allowing, for example for an additional
yield per year or the opportunity to grow a more profitable crop. Europe,
though, ultimately will be affected by these developments as well: food
shortages are expected due to demand in other markets, particularly the
emerging economies, even when taking into account the decline of Europe’s
population (European Commission 2012).
Limiting food
security risks under climate change requires new climate-smart agriculture
policies to be implemented. Around the world, a wide variety of adaptation and
mitigation projects are being trialed in the agricultural sector under such
headings as ‘carbon farming’ or ‘climate smart agriculture’ (hereafter: CSA). The
FAO website on
climate smart agriculture has a list of more than 150 projects around the
globe. Examples of these are the application of low water use technologies,
crop changes, tillage and residue management, land-use change, agroforestry,
enhancement of agro-biodiversity, etc.
So far, these, mostly experimental, projects have not or only barely
been brought under the existing legal framework on climate change adaptation
and mitigation.
With the
varieties in effects of agriculture on climate change and in the effects of
climate change per region, it is a challenge to come up with an overarching
legal framework that allows for both climate change mitigation and adaptation,
while maintaining or even improving food security as well as providing benefits
to as many people as possible. Although food security has been acknowledged as
an important issue under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,
bringing adaptation and mitigation in the agricultural sector under the UNFCCC
and the Kyoto Protocol is only happening at a slow pace. Emissions from land
use change and agriculture are included in the Protocol accounting mechanisms,
but only when measurable as verifiable changes in carbon stocks. In addition,
Parties could elect additional human-induced activities related to LULUCF
(Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry), specifically, forest management,
cropland management, grazing land management and revegetation, to be included
in its accounting for the first commitment period. Only four countries elected
for this option in that commitment period, hence strongly limiting the
possibilities under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as well. Furthermore,
methodological questions have led to restrictive limits. Soil sequestration,
for example, has been excluded from the CDM, and land use change can only
account for 1% of all CDM credits. Some support to developing countries in the
field of agriculture is provided for by the Adaptation Fund and the Green
Climate Fund.
In general,
it must be concluded that the instruments aimed at reducing greenhouse gas
emissions only apply to agriculture to a very limited extend. The relationship
between agriculture and climate change is considered to be too complex to be
included in current negotiations. There are seemingly insurmountable practical
difficulties in integrating agricultural emissions in an emissions trading
scheme.
At the
international level, it is not just international climate law under the UNFCCC,
but also international trade law under the WTO that is relevant when
researching the legal framework for CSA. On the one hand, current income
support for farmers may constrain CSA, for instance when support schemes do not
‘reward’ farmers for switching to agricultural practices that are aimed at
climate change mitigation and adaptation. Under the WTO, reducing market
distortions caused by income support to farmers have been discussed for years
now, albeit without significant progress towards the liberalization of trade in
agricultural products. On the other hand, the WTO’s intellectual property
rights law (TRIPS agreement) seems to favour access to climate smart
agricultural technologies and practices, as the TRIPS agreement protects IPRs
while at the same time favouring technology transfer to developing countries,
although the latter –in practice- still is problematic.
At the
domestic level, only in very few countries attempts are made to introduce
financial benefits to farmers for their mitigation efforts. Probably the best
example is Australia that, in 2011, enacted legislation that allows farmers to
(voluntarily) generate carbon credits that can be sold on the domestic and
international carbon market: the Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI). Thanks to
this initiative, Australia is the country with the most far-reaching example of
active legislation aimed at facilitating and stimulating CSA. Farmers earn
credits through agricultural emissions avoidance projects (projects that avoid
emissions of methane from the digestive tract of livestock, methane or nitrous
oxide from the decomposition of livestock urine or dung, methane from rice
fields or rice plants, methane or nitrous oxide from the burning of savannahs
or grasslands, methane or nitrous oxide from the burning of crop stubble in
fields, crop residues in fields or sugar cane before harvest, and methane or
nitrous oxide from soil), as well as through sequestration offsets projects.
In the EU,
CSA is still very much in the research phase and the regulatory framework is largely
absent. Farming is excluded from the EU ETS, but included in the Effort Sharing
Decision. The Effort Sharing Decision
establishes binding annual greenhouse gas emission targets for Member States
for the period 2013–2020. Member States have to develop their own policies in
order to achieve their targets and therefore, may put more emphasis on some
sectors than on others. For agriculture, emission reductions could for instance
be achieved through more efficient farming practices and conversion of animal
waste to biogas. Other than in Australia, LULUCF projects are explicitly
excluded from the Effort Sharing Decision, so important measures like cropland
and grazing land management and revegetation are not covered. The second route
towards addressing emissions from agriculture is through the EU Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform in 2013. Here mitigation and adaptation
policies meet, as the CAP is also the primary means for promoting climate
resilient agriculture. In the initial proposals, the European Commission
suggested to earmark 30% of the direct payments for farmers who apply
agricultural practices beneficial to climate change and the environment
(through crop diversification, maintenance of permanent pasture, the
preservation of environmental reservoirs and landscapes, etc.). In addition, it
was proposed to give increased financial support to agri-environment-climate
projects and organic farming under the EU´s rural development policy. In the
final stages of the negotiations, however, these proposals have been watered
down to a considerable extent.